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Internal Military Intervention in the United States

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Data on internal military interventions in the USA are presented for those periods in which they are available from US government sources: 1886-95, 1921-35 and 1943-90. Although the rate of intervention has varied from year to year and the targets of interventions have shifted from industrial workers to urban rioters, the overall rates of intervention have remained near the average during the years: about 18 interventions and 12,000 troops per year. A brief overview is given of the internal military interventions carried out before the Civil War (targeting especially American Indians and slaves), those between the Civil War and World War II, and those since World War II. Internal military surveillance has greatly increased during and after wars. There has been a tendency to blame the internal unrest which has led to military interventions on external enemies, which may have been a factor in preparation for external military action. In conclusion, the study of internal military intervention and the development of non-violent alternatives of conflict management are recommended to peace researchers and peace activists as a contribution to the abolition of war and militarism and to the construction of a culture of peace.

1. *Defining the Problem*

Given the great interest in recent years in the causes of war by peace researchers and in strategies for the abolition of militarism by peace activists, it is surprising that they have given so little attention to internal military intervention in Europe and North America. It is often recognized that internal interventions characterize developing or socialist countries, but few scholars have written on the relation of internal intervention to militarism in the Western powers. One exception may be found in the conception of the 'garrison states' by Harold Lasswell (1941), in which he expressed concern about the militarization of US society.

The present analysis focuses on the United States for two reasons. First, the USA is the dominant military power in the world today, and shifting from militarism to peace in the USA is of central concern. Second, US history is the one that I know best and about which I can make a detailed analysis (Adams, 1985).

When I began searching for data, I found to my surprise that there is no comprehensive list available of internal military interventions in the USA. Although official records for federal troops used in internal interventions are relatively complete, the records for state militia (National Guard) have been published by the federal govern-

ment only for certain years. To get around this problem I have presented the available data in three tables, corresponding to the periods for which the data may be found. It will be argued that these periods are probably representative of the past 125 years of US history.

For purposes of the present analysis, I have accepted the government's own definition of what constitutes a military intervention, basing this on the government lists of interventions since 1943, as shown in Table III. This corresponds to what is called 'civil disturbances' or 'civil disorders' in the *Congressional Record* of 4 March 1968 and the *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau* for fiscal years 1968 to 1990. This includes all military support to civil authority except those operations in cases of 'natural disasters and other emergencies'. A similar distinction is made in the historical summaries for the Department of the Army on which the data for federal interventions are based.

The data have been subdivided into a number of sub-categories in Table III in order to facilitate comparisons with data from previous periods of history. The categories of civil rights, labor disputes, anti-war and anti-nuclear activities, college disturbances, interventions in overseas possessions, those involving American Indians,

and prison disorders have been listed separately, leaving the interventions in urban riots in the category of 'civil disturbances'. These categories, along with suppression of unemployed activities, guarding prisoners, and pursuit of bandits and bank robbers, correspond to those used by the government sources for the earliest periods where full data are available.

The history of internal interventions in the USA can be divided into three periods marked by two watersheds, the Civil War and World War II. Prior to the Civil War and Reconstruction, the principal targets of internal interventions were slaves and Native Americans. After the wave of strikes of 1877, the principal target shifted to labor activists, beginning what was called in those days the class war or industrial warfare. World War II marked another watershed, after which the principal target shifted from organized workers to the disorganized unemployed who took part in urban riots. Although the number of troops used in internal interventions has varied from year to year, the overall rates of intervention have not changed very much from one historical period to another.

The main body of this article consists of a description of internal military interventions in the three periods of US history that are indicated above. Following that, consideration is given to internal military surveillance, which has tended to peak during periods of external war, and to the blaming of internal military actions on an external enemy image. Finally, it is argued that the study of internal military intervention and the development of non-violent alternatives to its functions would be a substantial contribution to the abolition of war and militarism and the construction of a culture of peace.

2. *Internal Military Interventions before 1877*

The US attitude towards internal interventions has always been paradoxical. From the beginning of US history, there has been a fear of standing armies and military control. The Declaration of Independence lists as

one of the major grievances against the British king: 'He has kept among us, in times of Peace, Standing Armies, without the consent of our Legislatures. He has affected to render the Military independent of, and superior to, the Civil Power.' Most of the state constitutions of the newly independent US republic asserted 'the danger of standing armies in time of peace, the superiority of the civil over the military authority, the right to freedom from troops being harbored in private dwellings, and prohibitions against military appropriations for longer than one or two years' (Ekirch, 1969, p. 141).

Despite the anti-militarist tradition, the first century of the USA culminated in an extraordinarily bloody internal war, the Civil War. And armed struggle around the issue of slavery both preceded and followed that war.

The South was an armed camp for the purpose of enforcing slavery prior to the Civil War. In his survey of American Negro slave revolts, Aptheker (1943) found records of about 250 revolts and conspiracies, but said that this was no doubt an underestimate. Most of the revolts were suppressed by state militia, for which records are not readily available. In addition to suppressing revolts, the military enforced a state of martial law. According to Mahon (1983) in his *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, before the US Revolution, 'the primary mission of the slave states' militia increasingly became the slave patrol' (p. 22) and after the revolution, 'the slave states continued to require militiamen to do patrol duty to discourage slave insurrections' (p. 54).

The militarization of Southern cities was described by F. L. Olmstead in the late 1850s, as quoted by Aptheker (1943, p. 69):

. . . police machinery such as you never find in towns under free government: citadels, sentries, passports, grapeshotted cannon, and daily public whippings . . . more than half of the inhabitants of this town were subject to arrest, imprisonment and barbarous punishment if found in the streets without a passport after the evening 'gunfire'. Similar precautions and similar customs may be discovered in every large town in the South . . . a military

organization which is invested with more arbitrary and cruel power than any police in Europe.

Aptheker, like others, speculates that the dependence of the South on militia to maintain suppression of slaves greatly undermined its ability to commit troops to the Civil War and may have been a major contributing factor in its defeat.

The records of federal troop interventions against slave revolts quoted by Reichley (1939) refer only to 'Negro Insurrections' in Louisiana, North Carolina, and Virginia in 1831. In Louisiana, two companies were engaged, in North Carolina two artillery companies, and in Virginia, where a full-scale revolt took place under the leadership of the slave Nat Turner, eleven federal companies were mobilized, over 3,000 Virginia militia, and the state militia of Maryland and North Carolina as well. Federal troops were also used to suppress the abolitionist insurrection led by John Brown at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in 1859.

There were other federal interventions against slave revolts according to Aptheker (1943). A battle in New Orleans in 1811 involved 60 army troops from New Orleans, 200 from Baton Rouge, and 400 state militia, with a toll of 66 slaves killed in the initial engagement and many others executed later. In 1816 and 1820 hundreds were killed by federal troops suppressing slave rebellions in Florida. Technically, one might say that these were not internal interventions because Louisiana did not become a state until 1812 and Florida not until 1845. Other interventions by federal troops against slave revolts occurred in Richmond, Virginia, in 1800, Mississippi in 1807, and New Orleans in 1826. In 1831, in response to rumors of slave revolts, federal troops were sent to New Orleans and to Ft Monroe, Virginia, to prepare for possible intervention, and federal troops were again mobilized in New Orleans in 1837 and 1840.

Internal warfare continued in the South after the Civil War during the period of Reconstruction. At first, the Southern states reinstated a militia which Mahon (1983, p. 108) describes as 'virtually the old Confederate Army down to the worn gray uniforms

left over from the Civil War'. Then, in 1867, the US Congress under Republican control outlawed these militia. Two years later, the Congress established a new militia composed primarily of black soldiers. Fighting then occurred between these black militia and the illegal white armies. According to Mahon, 'two hundred and ninety white rifle companies sprang up at one time in South Carolina alone' (p. 109). Eventually the old racist forces of the South regained the upper hand following numerous bloody confrontations. Details may be found in the history of federal troop interventions for that period published by the US Army's Center of Military History (Coakley, 1988).

Internal war and destruction of Native American societies also characterized early US history. A particularly brutal example was the Black Hawk War of 1832, as described by Mahon (1983, p. 86):

The Sauk and Fox Indians of Iowa, Illinois, and Wisconsin opposed removal in 1831 and 1832. The resultant Black Hawk War showed citizen soldiery at its worst. Many of the short-term irregulars considered these redmen to be animals, much lower on the life scale than man. They wanted this animal out of the way and welcomed the chance to kill it, especially since they could do so and prosper, for the United States took 10,000 citizen soldiers onto its payroll, 7,787 of them from Illinois.

An Indian War in Florida, known as the Second Seminole War, involved every unit of the US Army, along with about 1,000 sailors, some Marines and 30,000 irregulars, according to Mahon. In the federal reports, this war is called the 'removal of the Cherokees' (Reichley, 1939, p. 197).

Warfare against Native Americans continued at a high rate after the Civil War. According to one source, federal troops had 943 military engagements against Native Americans from 1865 to 1898 (Weigley, 1962, p. 267). Most of the engagements were small, but a few involved thousands of troops, including the Gibbon-Terry-Custer-Crook expedition against the Sioux and Cheyenne in 1876 and the campaign against Chief Joseph of the Nez Perce in 1877 (pp. 167-168). In recent years, the Indian occupation at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1973, was suppressed by the National Guard with US Army support. In

1975, the National Guard intervened to suppress 'Indian takeovers' at Wagner, South Dakota, and Gresham, Wisconsin. And in 1990 the National Guard were called out in Massena, New York, because of 'Indian civil disturbance'.

As far as I know, there has never been a full review of the use of federal and state military force against slaves and Native Americans in the first century of US history. These types of interventions receive little space in the authoritative review of the domestic use of federal military forces by Coakley (1988). Coakley gives extensive accounts of other interventions which took place in that period, however: the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794; the Patriot War and Dorr Rebellion of 1837 and 1842; the Utah expedition against the Mormons in 1857; the draft riots during the Civil War; and the use of force during Reconstruction.

3. *The Era of Industrial Warfare*

The strike wave of 1877 transformed internal military intervention in the USA into industrial warfare. It began with a railroad strike in West Virginia, which spread throughout the industrial states. Before it was over, 45,000 militia had been called into action, along with 2,000 federal troops on active duty and practically the entire US Army on alert (Riker, 1957, pp. 47–48). To realize the scope of this mobilization, one needs to know that according to Riker there were only 47,000 militia used during the entire Civil War, and the size of the entire US Army around 1877 was 25,000 (p. 41). From 1877 to 1900, the US Army was used extensively in labor disputes and a shared interest developed between the officer corps and US industrialists (Cooper, 1980).

The 1877 intervention gave birth to the modern National Guard. This point is agreed upon by the principal histories of the Guard (Derthick, 1965; Mahon, 1983; and Riker, 1957). As Riker documents in detail, not only did all of the states establish their National Guard at that time, but also the appropriations of the new Guard were almost perfectly correlated with the number of strikers in that state. He concludes that

'in short it is reasonable to infer that the primary motive for the revival of the militia was a felt need for an industrial police' (p. 55).

There was no reluctance in those days to call it a 'class war'. As Riker (1957, p. 48) describes the strike of 1877:

This strike developed class consciousness in the hitherto fairly docile American workingman and served as the prelude to the endemic strikes of the next decade. What is less seldom realized, however, is that the strike developed class consciousness in the owners and managers of corporations as well. . . . Thomas A. Scott, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad described the strike as an 'insurrection' and, even after the strike was well broken, seriously likened it to the beginning of the Civil War. When economic relations are discussed by businessmen in terms such as these, then the captain of industry cannot well avoid becoming, at least indirectly, a captain of armies also.

Derthick, Mahon and Riker all describe the close relationship between these 'captains of industry' and the National Guard. Businessmen were not only officers in the Guard and in the National Guard Association, but also provided much of its financing.

A debate ensued as to whether the National Guard or the US Army should get the task of being the industrial police. In 1877, the Secretary of War asked Congress for increased appropriations for the Army on the basis of its role as a strike-breaking force (Riker, 1957, p. 49). While General McClellan argued that 'state troops ought to fight the battles of the industrial war', the foremost military strategist, General Upton, urged that the regular army was the 'proper component to wage strike wars' (Mahon, 1983, p. 121).

In this period, about 80% of the military troops used for internal interventions were engaged in what the government called 'labor disputes'. This may be seen from Table I, at least for the period of 1886 to 1895, which is the period for which we have an accurate count of the number of troops involved. However, this is an underestimate, because several of the other categories could also be considered labor disputes. The interventions against Coxey's Armies of 1892, called 'lawlessness by

Table I. Internal Military Interventions in the United States 1886–1895

Nature of Intervention (1)	Forces (2)	No. of Interventions	No. of Troops Involved
Civil disturbances	NG	40	3,776
	Fed	0	0
Civil rights	NG	66	4,461
	Fed	0	0
Labor disputes	NG	118	75,956
	Fed	12	6,000+
American Indian	NG	7	2,440
	Fed	(3)	(3)
Prison disorders	NG	2	450
	Fed	0	0
Suppressing unemployed	NG	9	2,229
	Fed	5	500 + (4)
Guarding prisoners	NG	10	490
	Fed	0	0
Bandits and bank robberies	NG	4	121
	Fed	0	0
Other interventions	NG	47	3,890
	Fed	3	800+
Total	NG	303	93,813
	Fed	20	7,300+
	All	323	101,113+

1. Principle source for National Guard data is Alexander (1896). The following key is used for the nature of the intervention: Civil disturbance = race troubles and most of cases 'to suppress disorder'; Civil rights = 'to prevent lynchings'; Labor disputes = 'riots consequent upon labor troubles'; American Indian = 'Indian troubles'; Prison disorders = 'to prevent escape of prisoners'; Guarding prisoners = 'to prevent rescue of prisoners' and 'guards at executions'; Bandits = 'to capture criminals'; and Other includes all other categories except for protecting property at fires, cyclones, and floods, which is not considered here. The principle source for Federal data is Reichley (1939).

2. NG = National Guard; Fed = US Army, Army Reserves, or Marines.

3. Although Reichley (1939) does not list any federal interventions against native Americans, Weigley (1962, p. 267) counts 943 military engagements against Native Americans in the period of 1865–98.

4. Approximate troop figures are taken from the account of the battles against 'Coxey's armies' in Rich (1941, pp. 87–91).

Industrial Army' in the table, were conducted against unemployed workers who were converging from the Western states to the nation's capitol in order to protest. And the use of troops to attack workers who protested the use of Chinese strike-breakers in the West is also categorized separately.

Although complete records are not available from 1896 to 1920, there was frequent use of the National Guard and Army for strike-breaking during those years. Clendenon (1969) describes the Guard as a strike-breaking force in the Colorado mines in 1904, the textile mills of Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912, and the West Virginia and Colorado mines in 1913. The 1912 intervention in Colorado culminated in the 'Ludlow Massacre', in which state Guards-

men, many of whom were drawing pay as plant guards from Rockefeller's Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, fired with machine guns into a tent city of strikers' families, and when the tents were set on fire, 21 were killed, mostly women and children. During World War I, there were so many federal interventions against labor meetings and strikes that Jensen (1991, p. 143) comments that 'never had so many federal bayonets been in the streets of so many towns'. According to government reports, the Army intervened in 29 domestic disorders during this period without following Constitutional procedures (Preston, 1963, p. 116).

During those years between 1921 and 1935, for which records were relatively complete, 75% of the 82,000 troops engaged in

Table II. Internal Military Interventions in the United States 1921–1935

Nature of Intervention (1)	Forces (2)	Fiscal Years 1921–7 (3)	Fiscal Years 1928–30 (4)	Fiscal Years 1931–2 (5)	Fiscal Years 1933–5 (6)
Civil disturbances	NG	15 2,800~	4 *	**	0 0
	Fed	0 9	0	0	0 0
Civil rights	NG	0 0	0 0	**	0 0
	Fed	0 0	0 0	0	0 0
Labor disputes	NG	33 28,000~	10 *	**	31 31,582
	Fed	1 2,100	0 0	0	0 0
Prison disorders	NG	4 169	4 *	**	8 764
	Fed	0 0	0	0	0 0
Suppressing unemployed	NG	0 0	0 0	0	3 659
	Fed	0 0	0 0	1 600	0 0
Guarding prisoners	NG	14 1,100~	4 *	**	19 2,311
	Fed	0 0	0 0	0	0 0
Bandits and bank robberies	NG	2 57	1 *	**	12 464
	Fed	2 4,750	0 0	0	0 0
Other	NG	25 4,000	3 *	**	31 3,899
	Fed	0 0	0 0	0	1 200?
Total	NG	93 36,000~	26 *	**	104 39,679
	Fed	3 6,750	0	1 600	1 200?
	All	96 42,750~	26 *	**	105 39,879?

The first number in each set is the number of interventions; the second is the number of troops involved. No attempt is made to distinguish between troops actually deployed at the site of the incident and troops that were called up and placed at a distance on stand-by alert.

* National Guard data from 1928–30 consisted of a simple listing of interventions without figures for the number of troops involved.

** *Annual Report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau* for fiscal years 1931 and 1932 have no listings of the activities of the National Guard during those years, and I can find no published record of them elsewhere.

1. Unless otherwise indicated in the following notes, the categories listed here were those used by the source publications.

2. Abbreviations as in Table I.

3. *Sources: Annual Report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau* for each year from 1921 to 1927. Prior to 1921 these reports did not list interventions. Where names of military units were given rather than number of troops, the troop numbers were calculated from figures given that year for average troop strength by state and unit. Figures for federal intervention in labor disputes obtained from Reichley (1939, p. 201). Figures for federal intervention against banditry are from Parker (1970, p. 52).

4. *Sources: Annual Report of the Chief of the Militia Bureau* for 1928, 1929, and 1930. Interventions were listed, but without the number of troops involved. No federal troop interventions took place according to Reichley (1939).

5. No data are available for these years for National Guard interventions. The one federal intervention was suppression of the Bonus Army of the unemployed, for which troop figures are taken from *American Military History* (1969), p. 413.

6. *Sources: Congressional Record*, 74th Congress, II Session, Vol. 80, Part 2, pp. 2069–2081, Jan.–Feb. 1936. There is also mention in *American Military History* (1969, p. 413) of a federal intervention in 1934 when the Air Corps took over carrying airmail in a dispute with the airline companies. The number of troops involved is taken from the *New York Times*, 13 Feb. 1936.

internal interventions were used in what were termed 'labor disputes'. The data for this period are shown in Table II.

To a great extent the capitalists won the industrial wars. Perhaps the best example is that of the railroads. The initial intervention of 1877 against railroad workers was followed by an even bloodier intervention to break the national railroad strike of 1894.

By the time it was over, 14,186 armed men were used, including 1,936 federal troops, 4,000 state militia, and thousands of sheriffs, police, and special marshalls hired by management but authorized by the federal government (Mahon, 1983, p. 118). As described by the striker organizer, Eugene Victor Debs, the intervention came just as the union felt it was on the verge of victory:

At this juncture, there was delivered, from wholly unexpected quarters, a swift succession of blows . . . an army of detectives was equipped with badge and beer and bludgeon and turned loose . . . startling rumors were set afloat; the press volleyed and thundered and over all the wires sped the news that Chicago's white throat was in the clutch of a red mob; injunctions flew thick and fast, arrests followed, and our office and headquarters, the heart of the strike, was sacked, torn out and nailed up by the 'lawful' authorities of the federal government (Debs, 1948, p. 45).

Thanks to repeated military interventions and threats, it has never been possible for railroad workers in the USA to develop a unified national union. In 1922, over 13,000 troops were mobilized to counter a national railroad strike. And, in 1946, President Truman broke a national rail strike with a threat to call out federal troops to take over the running of the trains.

Although workers in the coal mines and steel mills eventually formed national unions in the 1930s, their earlier attempts were defeated by repeated interventions. After a pitched battle between steelworkers and armed private guards of the Carnegie Steel company in Homestead, Pennsylvania, in 1892, the government sent in 8,300 state militia. Under protection of the militia, the Company locked out the workers and brought in replacement workers to break the union. After costly court trials, the union leaders were acquitted of charges, but the union, not only at Carnegie, but throughout the steel industry, was destroyed (Yellen, 1936, pp. 72–100). The development of a national steel union was again defeated in 1919 following the intervention of federal troops in Gary, Indiana (pp. 251–291), and a national steel union was not organized until 1937, again despite military intervention (*Labor Fact Book*, vol. 1938, pp. 117–118).

A similar story can be told of efforts to organize a national union of coal miners. We have already mentioned bloody interventions in Colorado and West Virginia before World War I. In 1920–21 there was a war in the coalfields of West Virginia between the mineworkers and a military force that included 2,100 troops and the first use of the Army Air Service for aerial bombing.

The war culminated in the spectacular battle of Blair Mountain in which the mineworkers were ultimately defeated (Savage, 1990). Other interventions in the coalfields came in the summer of 1922, when over 7,000 National Guard were deployed in seven states, and again in 1934, when over 3,000 Guard were deployed in four states. In 1950, a strike in the coalfields of the Eastern half of the country was only settled after President Truman threatened government seizure of the mines (*Labor Fact Book*, vol. 10, 1951, p. 121).

During the 1930s, many officials were elected with the help of organized labor, which made them reluctant to use troops against strikers. In some cases this made a difference in the ability of workers to organize. In 1937, Michigan Governor Murphy was urged by the automobile companies to break the sit-down strike by workers in the factories in Flint. Although he deployed troops around the plants, Murphy refused to order them to attack. In the meantime, the workers won an historical victory in their negotiations with the company, which laid the base for unionization of the automobile industry (Keeren, 1980, p. 181).

During World War II, the government seized 34 defense plants, presumably to prevent or break strikes by the workers, according to one source (Jensen, 1991, p. 217). I have found details on only one of the seizures, the use of 3,500 troops to break the strike of workers at North American Aviation in Los Angeles in 1941 (Rich, 1941, pp. 179–183). Although Jensen says that there were 25 plant seizures from 1943 to 1945 (p. 303), she does not indicate how many troops were involved.

The rate of internal military intervention remained high throughout the period from 1877 to 1940. For the 10-year period from 1886 to 1895, shown in Table I, an average of about 8,200 troops per year was used in labor disputes. For the 10 years for which quantitative records were available in the 1920s and 1930s, shown in Table II, an average of about 6,200 troops per year was used in labor disputes. Although we do not have exact figures for other years, some no doubt had lower figures, while others, for example

Table III. Internal Military Interventions in the United States 1943-90

Nature of Intervention (1)	Forces (2)	Fiscal Years 1943-51 (3)	Fiscal Years 1952-60 (4)	Fiscal Years 1961-8 (5)	Fiscal Years 1969-76 (6)	Fiscal Years 1977-83 (7)	Fiscal Years 1984-90 (8)
Civil disturbances	NG	13 7,381	15 1,092	118 203,758	192 *	40 *	9 2,353
Civil rights	Fed	1 ~ 6,000	-	1 4,700	1 ~ 8,000	-	-
Labor disputes	NG	-	5 11,253	20 ~ 72,071	7 *	-	4 5,136
Anti-war	Fed	-	1 1,200	4 ~ 28,100	-	-	-
Anti-nuclear	NG	8 7,067+	6 3,971+	1 900	29 *	53 *	6 1,355
College disturbances	Fed	-	-	-	2 30,000+	2 1,289+	-
Overseas possessions	NG	-	-	2 870	16 *	3 *	-
American Indian	Fed	-	-	-	11 33,677+	-	-
Prison disorders	NG	-	1 ~ 100	2 1,396	18 *	-	-
Other interventions	Fed	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	NG	1 ~ 5,000 (Puerto Rico)	-	-	-	1 *	4 2,831 (Guam, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands)
	Fed	-	-	-	1 ~ 7,000 (Puerto Rico)	1 *	-
	NG	-	-	-	3 *	-	1 24
	Fed	-	-	-	1 220	-	-
	NG	-	6 ~ 1,360	1 ~ 10	19 *	9 *	5 443
	Fed	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NG	4 1,089	4 ~ 940	17 ~ 3,604	9 *	2 *	-
	Fed	-	-	-	-	-	-
	NG	26 20,537+	37 18,716+	161 282,609+	293 178,893*	108 48,752*	29 12,142
	Fed	1 ~ 6,000	1 1,200	5 ~ 32,800	16 78,897+	2 1,289+	-
	All	27 26,537+	38 19,916+	166 315,409+	309 257,790+	110 50,041+	29 12,142

Sum for all years combined: 679 incidents involving over 681,835 troops.

See Table II for the nature of the numbers listed.

* National Guard data from 1969-83 listed all interventions, including the type of disturbance involved, but did not list the number of troops by incident. Instead, they gave only a total for the number of troops used in civil disturbances each year.

1. Unless otherwise indicated in the following notes, all categories were listed as such in the source publications.

2. Abbreviations as in Table I.

3. Sources: *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard for 1943-45* and the *Congressional Record*, 4 March 1968, pp. 5037-5038. In the years prior to 1943, the *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard* did not list internal interventions. The number of federal troops deployed in Detroit in 1943 is taken from Lee & Humphrey (1943), p. 44.

4. Source: *Congressional Record*, 4 March 1968, pp. 5037-5038.

5. Sources: 1956-67 data are from *Congressional Record*, 4 March 1968, pp. 5037-5038. Data for 1968 are taken from Appendix N of 1968 *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard*. Figures quoted in the text of the *Annual Report* are less than those in the Appendix. The incidents categorized in the Appendix as 'civil disturbances' at the two political conventions and the Presidential Inauguration are counted here as anti-war incidents.

6. Sources: National Guard data taken from *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard*, 1969-76. Federal data are taken from *US Army Historical Summary*, 1969-78. For purposes of troop counts, one Army brigade is listed here as 4,000 troops and one Marine regiment as 7,000. The number of troops deployed at anti-war demonstrations and in the Post Office in Fiscal Year 1970 were not given in the *Army Historical Summary* and figures were taken from *Facts-on-file* for 1970.

7. Sources: National Guard data taken from *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard*, 1977-83. Federal data are taken from *US Army Historical Summary*, 1977-83.

8. Sources: National Guard data taken from *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard*, 1984-1990. Federal data are taken from *US Army Historical Summary*, 1985-6 (others not available at time of writing). Interventions in Arizona in 1984-5 were listed as 'civil disturbances' in National Guard reports but have been classified here as labor disputes. Interventions in Alabama and Georgia were listed as 'civil disturbances' in National Guard reports, but have been classified here as civil rights incidents.

in 1877 and during World War I, had higher than average figures.

4. Internal Military Interventions since World War II

Internal military interventions have continued at a high rate since World War II, but the target has shifted. Labor interventions have continued, but at a lower rate, and the most massive interventions have been against urban rioters. As shown in Table III, over 200,000 troops were used during the period 1961–8 to control what was called 'civil disturbances', and probably almost as many more during the period 1969–76, when detailed records were not published.

Interventions against urban riots are not new. In 1919, martial law was declared in order to control riots in Washington, DC, and by 27 July the force had grown to 12,000 troops under the command of Army General Haan (High, 1969, p. 121). Similarly, in 1943 about 6,000 federal troops and 5,000 National Guard were deployed after urban riots struck Detroit (Lee & Humphrey, 1943, p. 44).

However, the extent of riot interventions in recent years surpasses anything seen before in US history: 13,398 National Guard in Watts in 1965, 10,253 National Guard and 4,700 federal troops in Detroit in 1967, and the list goes on. In the Los Angeles riots of 1992, the government deployed 2,800 National Guard with another 3,200 standby, and 4,000 marines and US Army troops.

Two other types of internal military intervention have also been prominent in the recent period: civil rights enforcement, and control of anti-war demonstrations. During the 1950s and 1960s over 100,000 troops were engaged in enforcing civil rights legislation and protecting civil rights demonstrators in the South. And during the 1960s and 1970s, tens of thousands of troops were used to control anti-war activities, largely associated with the student movements at the time of the war in Vietnam.

The rate of use of troops since 1943 has been somewhat higher than the rate in earlier periods. The average of 14,000

troops per year from 1943 to 1990 compares to an average of over 10,000 per year from 1886 to 1895 and an average of 8,000 per year for the years in which data were available from 1921 to 1935. Of course, the increase may be related to the population increase, since the US population has expanded fourfold in these years.

Despite the decrease in the quantity of interventions in labor disputes in recent years, there is still an important qualitative effect. The 1970 intervention of 30,000 federal troops to take over the jobs of striking postal workers sent a message to government employees that all means would be used to break their strikes. And the 1982 intervention of 1,248 military air traffic controllers to replace strikers was seen by organized labor as a signal from the incoming Reagan Administration that it would not hesitate to use the military not only to break a strike, but to destroy a national trade union.

One may argue that the shift from labor to urban riot interventions reflects the consequences of the victory of capital over organized labor and the extension of class warfare from organized labor to the unemployed. There is no question that urban riots are related to the unemployment and under-employment that has resulted from the flight of industry out of the unionized Northern cities towards non-union areas in the South, rural areas, and overseas. During this time the strength of organized labor has declined greatly, to the point that today less than half the proportion of workers are in unions as compared to the period immediately after World War II. As Robin Higham puts it in his introduction to *Bayonets in the Streets* (1969, pp. 1–2), although 'money has not been everything':

Money has, of course, been at the heart of most of the problems in which the military have been used in civil peacekeeping roles. Money and working conditions have been at the heart of labor disturbances. Money has been a major ingredient of the complex problems of the inner cities. Money has been a major factor in the expansion and equipping of police forces to deal with the increasingly sophisticated and complex problems of the protection of property and the control of crime in the United States.

5. *Internal Military Surveillance*

The close relationship between external war and internal military interventions is revealed by the increased use of internal military surveillance during wartime.

Massive secret surveillance of the USA by the military began in World War I. It has been documented by Jensen (1991), although much of the information has been secret and we do not know how much is still hidden in unavailable government files. During World War I, a campaign was initiated in conjunction with big business to spy on workers and union organizers. The campaign was led by the American Protective League (APL) associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Plant Protective services (PPS) associated with the Military Intelligence Department (MID) of the War Department. The APL attained a field force of about 100,000 who spied on workers and unions in tens of thousands of industrial plants with defense contracts. The MID had hundreds of agents working secretly in industrial cities. According to Jensen (1991, p. 152):

Agents infiltrated labor unions where they made regular, detailed reports on meetings, organizing, strike strategies, and the activities of leaders. Agents sometimes assumed leadership or took the initiative in causing dissension in the unions or submitted recommendations that employees be fired for union activities or for radicalism.

Although the APL and MID were supposed to be disbanded after the war, the system of internal surveillance was continued under military contingency plans called War Plans White and later Emergency Plans White, administered by the secret G-2 section of military intelligence. War Plans White was established in 1919 by the War Plans Department under General Haan and a special committee of the Army War College that came to the conclusion that the USA was on the verge of a revolution (Jensen, 1991, p. 188):

Russians and Austro-Hungarians were the most dangerous elements, but any area with a large foreign element was in danger. The 'Black Belt' of the South similarly was a 'region of potential danger'. Neither blacks nor immigrants, particularly

those who spoke Yiddish or Polish, made good officers. Officers concluded that a class war was a distinct possibility within two or three years. Each community would have its revolutionists and loyalists, and there would be no sectional division as there had been in the Civil War. Therefore, all people and the entire infrastructure of the country were in danger. Plants, railroads, telephones, telegraphs, roads – all were liable to fall into the hands of the revolutionaries.

Although we do not know much of the activities of G-2, we know from Jensen (1991, pp. 203–204) that they were active during the Bonus March by the unemployed in 1933, which was smashed by federal troops under General MacArthur, and during the San Francisco general strike of 1934, which was suppressed by military intervention.

Again during World War II a massive system of surveillance against workers and unions was established in US industries. By 1941, the FBI and G-2, with the help of the American Legion, had a system of surveillance employing 10,000 undercover informants in over 1,000 industrial plants. The Counter-Intelligence Corps of G-2 grew to 5,000 agents, almost half of whom were operating domestically in the USA, and it claimed to have a network of 250,000 secret informants. Over two million civilians were investigated during the war, and over 2,000 workers were fired or excluded from sensitive jobs.

After World War II, the information files and results of the loyalty investigations were used to purge the government, trade unions, and the professions of radical influences. G-2 surfaced again when it was revealed that the protest movement against the war in Vietnam was infiltrated and monitored by over 1,000 plain-clothes army agents operating out of 300 posts across the USA (Jensen, 1991, p. 241).

Military surveillance has always been secret, which makes it difficult to document its full extent. The Plant Protection Section of World War I was kept secret in the National Archives until 1975 (Jensen, 1991, p. 158). What we know of the military surveillance of anti-war protests in the Vietnam era came out only because of a 1970 exposé

by a former agent, Christopher Pyle (Jensen, 1991, p. 246).

6. *Internal War and the External Enemy Image*

It has often been claimed or implied that a policy of internal military interventions is necessary in the USA to protect the country against foreign enemies. This may have helped to lay the base for the preparation of the country to engage in foreign wars.

As early as 1877, the enemy image was used to justify internal intervention against labor activists. Strikers were portrayed as 'foreign communists' in the 1878 book *Strikers, Communists, Tramps, and Detectives* by Allan Pinkerton (1969). Pinkerton was not only the author of spy books that were so popular that they were reprinted in many editions, but he was also the founder and head of a vast system of private spies and guards hired by the major industrial capitalists (Jensen, 1991, p. 279). In 1902, the same reasoning may be found in the *National Guardsman*, which characterized labor agitators as the 'scum of foreign countries' (Mahon, 1983, p. 151).

Bills for the deportation of radical aliens were debated regularly by the US Congress, which responded to the public image, cultivated by big business and mass media, that labor activism was the work of foreign agitators. The Immigration Act of 1903 excluded immigrants and deported resident aliens if they were 'anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force and violence of the Government of the United States'. The Immigration Law was made even harsher in 1917 to include as well those who were found to be 'advocating or teaching the unlawful destruction of property'. This law was aimed specifically at the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), a radical labor movement of that era. It was used as the legal basis for massive raids, arrests and deportations of IWW activists in 1919–21 (Preston, 1963).

It was often claimed that the IWW, which had many aliens in its ranks, represented a foreign conspiracy. For example, the head of military police at Camp Lewis, Wash-

ington, whose troops took part in IWW raids and arrests, claimed that the IWW was manipulated by the Russian consul in Seattle who was 'undoubtedly a German agent' (Preston, 1963, p. 159).

The attacks on the IWW during World War I were an example of what Jensen calls the 'rage militaire'. Beginning with the Spanish–American War in 1898 and extending through two World Wars and the Cold War, domestic labor organizers and anti-war activists have been attacked as agents of the enemy. Jensen (1991, p. 75) describes the process as:

... a mounting tide of accusations by Americans against other residents, both citizen and alien, of being spies from the newly declared enemy. These agents of an evil enemy government, 'bad spies', would penetrate the internal defenses of the country, thus attacking it from within, and bring about military defeat by sending information to the enemy.

The 'rage militaire' pervaded the thinking of military intelligence not only during the war, but after as well. For example, one finds the following analysis described by Scheips (1989) quoting from a report written by a Major Dowell and issued secretly by the Command and General Staff School of Fort Leavenworth in 1922–3:

There were (count them!) 1,042,000 ultra-radicals in such places as Chicago, Cleveland, New York, Seattle, and San Francisco, in that order, who were bent upon 'the ultimate extermination of the so-called capitalistic class' and all that went with it. 'About ninety percent of the anarchistic agitation ... is traceable to aliens.'

Throughout the history of the Military Intelligence Division, its officers have been guided by the belief that foreign agents are responsible for the militancy of labor leaders (Jensen, 1991, p. 265).

The Russian Revolution gave substance to what had previously been only a shadowy enemy image. Before the communists gained power in Russia in 1917, it was difficult to say what foreign power was being served by domestic labor agitation. After the Russian Revolution, it became easy. Many US radicals openly supported the new communist government of the Soviet Union, and some formed the Communist

Party of the USA. Meanwhile, the US government sent 12,000 troops to Murmansk, Russia, in 1918 as part of the international drive to overthrow the new regime. From that point on, anti-communism as domestic policy could be linked directly to anti-communism as foreign policy.

The enemy image of the Soviet Union and the hunt for spies became a rationale after World War II for the systematic destruction of militant trade unionism in the USA. The militant unions of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) which had formed during the 1930s were dismantled by a combination of government and company attacks. The period is usually recalled as 'McCarthyism', named after the Senator who headed a committee which claimed to find communists throughout all levels of government, and whose investigations destroyed the careers of many radicals of the time.

A favored method of enemy image campaigns has been the press leak to the mass media, often from anonymous sources. In World War I, sources close to the APL and MID leaked a claim that the War Department had secretly put to death 14 enemy spies, apparently in an attempt to get more Congressional money for espionage (Jensen, 1991, p. 167). The truth is that only one German spy was caught in World War I (p. 177), while a US socialist of German descent was lynched (p. 169). Similarly, in World War II it was the Office of Naval Intelligence that leaked spy stories to editors of popular magazines as it tried to get Congressional appropriations for espionage (p. 212).

The use of press leaks about spies reached its peak in the hands of Senator McCarthy during the early years of the Cold War. It was not necessary for him to substantiate the leaks, because the damage was done with the initial announcement, and few people remembered later whether they were substantiated or not.

At the same time as the enemy image of the Soviet Union increased after the 1917 Russian Revolution, the references to class warfare in the United States all but disappeared from official parlance. It may be sug-

gested that this correspondence was not accidental, but reflected a direct relationship, as domestic labor problems could now be blamed on the influence of the Russian communists. It got to the point after the McCarthy era that one would think from public statements of officials and from the mass media that the USA had become a classless society. Often, those who had the temerity to speak of social class, including leading academics and writers, were branded as communists. Once they were silenced, the analysis of social class and class warfare was left only to the communists themselves. This, in turn, was used to confirm that such an analysis was a foreign idea deriving from the Soviet Union. As recently as 1981, one of the early acts of the Reagan Administration was to forbid any federal funding of research focused on social class by ADAMHA, one of its largest funding agencies (American Psychological Association, 1982, p. 10).

7. Relevance for Peace Researchers and Activists

The unchanging rate of internal military intervention in the USA and the lack of attention to such intervention in the literature on war and peace are in striking contrast to the rapid changes in other aspects of war and peace. It is argued here that this reflects an oversight which peace researchers and activists should address in the coming years.

These are times of remarkable change, both for the institutions of war and for the public consciousness that a new era of peace can be attained. The end of the Cold War and the increased peace-keeping responsibilities of the UN have been accompanied by a trend for nations to replace military dictatorships and militarized systems by democratic governance. The non-violent movements of Gandhi and King have inspired movements in South Africa, Eastern Europe and elsewhere that have brought down militarized systems without resort to war. The awareness that in the nuclear age there would be no winner of a world war, and the increased attitude of glo-

bal citizenship facilitated by the spread of literacy and the pervasiveness of mass communication have helped inspire hope and action for peace around the world.

Elsewhere I have given reason to believe that this is now the first generation that can abolish war (Adams, 1987) and that there has been a progressive increase in the effectiveness of anti-war movements, at least in the USA (Adams, 1985). The fact that the Gulf War had to be limited to a few weeks in duration if massive anti-war protests in the USA were to be avoided may be seen as a recent confirmation of this trend.

Now there is consideration not only of the dismantling and conversion of the institutions of militarism, but also of an even more profound social change from a culture of war and violence to a culture of peace (Boulding, 1992). Despite frequent claims to the contrary, there is nothing in our human nature that precludes such a transformation (Adams, 1989). In fact, on the basis of the evidence contained in this paper, we may present an alternative to the recent claims that enemy images are biologically determined (Sagan & Druyan, 1992; Smith, 1992). The creation of these enemy images often seems inexplicable, because fear prevents public discussion of their origin. Under conditions such as McCarthyism in the USA, even the questioning of the enemy image could be considered as an act of treason.

In considering the abolition of war, more attention needs to be given to internal military intervention, because it is closely related to external military activity and also because it is frequent, not only in the USA, but throughout the world.

The relation between internal and external military interventions is complex. The question has been reviewed recently by Levy (1989), who based his analysis of the diversionary theory of war on the sociological theory of Simmel as reinterpreted by Coser (1956) and on data from political science and history. Most of the relationships cited by Levy may be found in the data presented here from the USA.

Levy analyzes both the internalization of external conflict and the externalization of

internal conflict. The former may be illustrated by the internal conflicts in the USA during the Vietnam War: both the anti-war protests and the urban riots which increased when anti-poverty programs were cut in order to pay for the war effort. The second may be illustrated by the persistent claims that domestic labor unrest in the USA is the product of communist enemies abroad, which reached a peak in the McCarthy period and contributed to the development of the Cold War.

On another level, the close relation between internal and external military activity is evident from their common institutional basis. The soldiers and officers and the funding of military forces are available for use in either external or internal situations.

It would be useful to investigate the frequency of internal military intervention elsewhere in the world. Using one definition, the USA may have less internal intervention than other countries. Finer (1988, pp. 310–311) found that about 37% of the world's states between 1958 and 1973 had military interventions defined as 'the armed forces' constrained substitution of their own policies and/or their persons, for those of the recognized civilian authorities', and four countries had four or more such interventions during this period. Using this narrow definition, one may maintain that the USA had no such interventions. On the other hand, the use of the military as an extension of law enforcement may be greater in the USA than in other countries. We have no direct measure, but this is suggested by the related measure of rate of imprisonment. According to the *New York Times* of 11 February 1992, the US rate is much higher than the rate in other countries, being ten times higher than that of Japan, Sweden, Ireland, or the Netherlands.

Such an expanded analysis of internal intervention will require considerable work. There is no reason to think that government records in other countries will always be as complete as those in the USA. After all, even in the case of the USA, we have found that records of state interventions to enforce slavery are not available for the period pre-

ceding the Civil War. Also, the US data are restricted to interventions by the National Guard and US Army, Reserves, and Marines. It does not include other forces used in similar fashion, such as federal marshalls. Although this is probably not a great problem for the US data, it could be of considerable importance in other countries, where special police may perform the function of internal interventions.

Internal military intervention needs to be addressed because it can endanger or block the development of democracy, which is an important prerequisite for a transition from a culture of war to a culture of peace. Evidence from a number of studies shows that democratic countries do not go to war against each other (Gleditsch, 1992). Although the definition of democratic countries in these studies does not preclude the presence of internal military interventions, it is evident that such interventions can endanger a democracy.

We need a refined concept of democracy that takes into consideration all aspects of militarism, including internal interventions. A country that relies on military force to resolve conflicts among its citizens should not be considered as an ideal democracy. In this respect, one may note that a study of the motivation of urban rioters in the United States found that they were angry at their continued exclusion from US economic and social life, which they felt was the result of discrimination rather than of personal inadequacy (Caplan & Paige, 1968). The authors focused on participants in the 1967 riots in Detroit and Newark, but there is no reason to believe that the results would be any different from the participants in the Los Angeles riots of 1992.

Although the abolition of war eventually will require the abolition or conversion of all military institutions, this may not occur if these institutions are relied upon to maintain internal control. Therefore, one of the tasks for those who would abolish war should be to help develop alternatives to internal military interventions. No one expects that the conflicts that have led to these interventions in the past, whether ethnic, racial, or class conflicts, are going to

disappear, but it should be possible to promote the development of new means of conflict management that do not involve or threaten the use of violence. Anti-war activists should play a catalytic role in the development of such alternatives.

Of course, the transition from a culture of war to a culture of peace cannot occur abruptly, but must take place in a series of stages. During these stages, it may be useful to distinguish between types of military intervention, some of which may be more justifiable than others. For example, were the interventions to uphold civil rights legislation in the US South in the 1950s and 1960s justifiable in a way that other military interventions were not? This question might be related fruitfully to debate on when and if force is justifiable in the case of UN peace-keeping. But whether or not some military interventions can be justified in the short term, there is no doubt that in the long term we need to develop non-military means of peace-building and to promote societies in which internal military interventions are no longer needed or carried out.

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